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. ABSTRACT
This paper explores the question of how radical changes are implemented in organizations. The literature
either does not directly address this issue or implies that radical change can only be implemented rapidly.
In fact, to speak of the gradual implementation of radical change may at first glance appear paradoxical:
how can radical change be implemented slowly? We examine the assumptions underlying various notions
of radical change and suggest that it may be useful for both conceptual and managerial reasons to
distinguish, at least analytically, between the nature or degree of organizational change (radical or
incremental) and the pace or speed of its implementation (rapid or gradual). Drawing on the findings of
a field study that investigated the implementation of radical change in systems development, we show that
the gradual implementation of radical change may not only be feasible, but also effective in some
situations. Specifically, we identify characteristics of the organizational context and the technological
innovation that can indicate the conditions under which gradual implementation of radical changes may be
, appropriate.
1. INTRODUCTION Bridges and O'Keefe 1984; Orlikowski 1993; Tushman and
Romanelli 1985). In contrast to incremental change, where
There is considerable attention being paid today - both in established structures, processes, and knowledge are ex-
the research and practitioner literatures - to the importance tended and augmented, radical change replaces the status
of organizational change around the introduction of new quo with a new order of things and as a result may create
, technology. Calls to reinvent the corporation, reengmeer serious disruptions in structures, processes, operations,
business processes, and redesign work flows, have become knowledge, and morale. Jobs are altered and eliminated,
the fashionable response to the so-called information skills are gained and lost, information flow is redefined and
technology paradox. Hammer's (1990) by now well-known rerouted, processes are transformed and created, responsi-
dictum, "Don't Automate, Obliterate," accurately captures bilities are transferred, and power bases are undermined.
the general sentiment: to gain real benefits from invest- Managing such disruptions becomes critical to the ext)eri-
ment in information technology, managers must accomplish ences and outcomes associated with radical organizational
radical change in their organizations. change.
Implementing radical change in organizations is no mean This paper explores the question of how radical changes are
feat, as several studies comparing radical and incremental implemented in organizations. The literature either does
change have demonstrated (Dewar and Dutton 1986; Ettlie, not directly address this issue or implies that radical change
325
can only be implemented rapidly. In fact, to speak of the logical innovation (Dewar and Dutton 1986; Ettlie, Bridges
gradual implementation of radical change may at first and O'Keefe 1984; Pennings 1988; Tushman and Romanelli
glance appear paradoxical: how can radical change be 1985),so as to indicate "the degree of change they create
implemented slowly? We became intrigued by this ques- in the existing practice of the adopting organization"
tion during a research study of the implementation of (Damanpour 1988, p. 549). Incremental change amounts to
CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) tools in an extension of the status quo, that is, adjustments or
systems development. Orlikowski (1993) and Fichman and refinements in current products, processes, relationships,
Kemerer (1993) have shown that a number of software knowledge, and norms. Such changes represent "minor
development innovations such as CASE tools, development improvements or simple adjustments in current technology"
methodologies, and programming languages can represent (Dewar and Dutton 1986, p. 1423). Radical change replac-
radical change in the work, knowledge, and organization of es the status quo, requiring a shift to fundamentally dif-
systems development. The organization we were studying ferent products, processes, relationships, knowledge, and
was clearly implementing a radical change in software norms. In using the notions of radical and incremental
development, represented by the adoption of the IE method- change, these innovation researchers do not refer to and
ology and IEF CASE tools. Yet, the implementation of appear to make no assumptions about the pace with which
these radical changes appeared to be proceeding somewhat the change is accomplished.
gradually. This apparent paradox prompted us to examine
the relationship between the nature or degree of change and
the pace or speed of its implementation, and in particular to 1.2 Literature Focusing on the
confront the oft-taken-for-granted notion that radical change Pace of Change Only
can only be implemented quickly. In contrast to the expec-
tation that the slow implementation of radical change While some researchers focus specifically on the nature of
necessarily means reducing it to a series of incremental change, others focus only on the pace of change, without
changes, our research findings suggest that under certain making any reference to the degree of change being imple-
conditions the gradual implementation of radical change mented. For example, in his research on organizational
may be not only feasible, but also effective. innovations, Van de Ven (1993, p. 286) advocates rapid
implementation because the trial period of an innovation is
Before considering the research study which generated brief: "After the honeymoon period, innovations terminate
these implications, we believe it is instructive to examine at disproportionately higher rates, in proportion to the time
some of the assumptions that underlie our understandings required for their implementation." Similarly, Kanter
and notions of radical change. In particular, an examina- (1983) argues that because slow implementation of change
tion of both business and academic writings on the topic may allow resistance among workers to accumulate, deci-
suggests that there are multiple and different meanings as sive and expeditious action on the part of management is
well as uses of the term. Our research findings have made required. In the same vein but taking an opposing stance,
us realize that it is useful for both conceptual and mana- other researchers argue that a more gradual pace of imple-
gerial reasons to distinguish, at least analytically, between menting change may be more effective in general. For
the nature or degree of change (radical or incremental) and example, Hage and Aiken (1970, p. 106) suggest that the
the pace or speed of its implementation (rapid or gradual). longer the implementation period, the longer the period of
That is, it is possible to characterize an organizational trial and error, thus "the greater the chances of the new
change in terms of two dimensions, as represented by the program achieving its intended objectives." Likewise,
two questions: how big is the change [nature] and how Rogers (1983, p. 364) notes that "too-rapid implementation
quickly is the change accomplished [pace]. In this we of the innovation...can lead to disastrous results" because
follow Gersick's (1991) recommendation to differentiate when the introduction process is rushed, problems that later
between the processes of change (e.g., pace of change) and interfere with effective use of the technology may be
their outcomes (e.g., nature of change). As our brief ignored. While these researchers differ on whether they
review of the literature will indicate, such a distinction is advocate a slow or fast pace of implementation, they are
not always made. We believe that disentangling these two similar to the extent that Iione of them specify the type or
dimensions of change can be particularly valuable in nature of change to which their recommendations apply.
helping us think about and deal with the implementation of
radical change.
13 Literature Combining the Nature of
Change and the Pace of Change
1.1 Literature Focusing on the
Nature of Change Only In contrast to those researchers who only focus on one of
other of the two dimensions of change (nature or pace), a
The technological innovation literature makes a strong number of commentators in both the research and business
distinction between incremental and radical types of techno- communities see these dimensions as either inseparable or
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as interdependent. On the former side are researchers in of pace of implementation in the literature do nol explicitly
organizational strategy who assume that the dimensions of discuss the nature of change. For those authors advocating
nature and pace of change are not independent. That is, rapid or gradual implementation, it is often unclear whether
they make assumptions about both the nature of change and their recommendations apply to radical or incremental
the speed with which change is accomplished when they innovations - or both. Those who are specific about the
use terms such as incremental (or evolutionary), radical (or nature of change when advising a particular implementation
revolutionary), and quantum change (Miller and Friesen pace imply a strict coupling between rapid implementation
1982; Mintzberg 1978; Mintzberg and Waters 1982). For and radical change (Hammer 1990; Sviokla 1992; Tushman,
example, Quinn (1980, 1982) describes "logical incrementa- Newman and Romanelli 1986) and phased implementation
lism" as a way of constructing business strategy that of incremental change (Tyre and Ortikowski 1993, 1994).
combines a "step by step" process [pace] with an "incre- Yet, there is some empirical evidence that the implementa-
mental" effect [nature]. tion of radical change does not have to be done rapidly.
Based on a study of 41 firms implementing flexible manu-
While tiot going so far as to consider nature and pace of facturing systems, Ettlie (1986) found that a gradual pace
chal ge as inseparable, many writers treat these dimensions of change was among the most frequently cited factors
as highly interdependent. That is, they assume that only contributing to the successful implementation of radical
particular combinations of these two dimensions are fea- technological changes. He argues that "it is wise to take a
sible. For example, Hammer (1990; Hammer and Chainpy strategic approach to phased adoption and implementation
1993) has argued that a rapid implementation is the only for these major [radical] ... changes in systems" (1986, p.
feasible way of accomplishing radical change. He notes 80). In a similar vein, Greiner (1992) has suggested that a
that "reengineeriiig cannot be planned ineticulously and gradual approach toward organizational restructuring is
accomplished in small and cautious steps. It' s an all-or- associated with more favorable change outcomes.
nothing proposition with an uncertain result" (1990, pp.
104-105). Tushinati, Newman and Roinanelli (1986, p. 39) The implication of these various discussions and recom-
observe that resistance to "fundamental change is natural. mendations is thus ambiguous and the question - which
If frame-breaking [radical] change is implemented slowly, pace of implementation is more effective in the context of
then individuals have a greater opportunity to undermine radical change - has not been systematically addressed.
the changes and organizational inertia works to further stifle The conditions that indicate a rapid versus a gradual pace
fundamental change." Likewise, in the area of expert of implementing radical change remain unspecified. That is
systems, Sviokla (1992, p. 30) notes that transformation tile issue we explore in this paper.
technologies (his term for radical changes) "need swift,
concentrated action to make change. The benefits of speed Below we examine the details of one organization's experi-
have been documented copiously." ence in implementing a radical change, paying close atten-
tion to the nature of the changes being realized and the
With respect to increinental chatiges, sotne researchers have timing with which various changes were accomplished. We
suggested that a gradual pace of implementation is war- then interpret the findings in the context of the rapid versus
ranted. For example, Tyre and Orlikowski (1993, 1994) gradual pace debate and attempt to outline some of the
have shown that the introduction of new production tech- organizational and technological conditions that appear to
nologies may be more effectively accomplished if executed facilitate either rapid or gradual implementations of radical
through a series of phases, In their research, they found change. While our study examines the radical change that
lhat the implementation and adaptation of technologies in was associated with the introduction of new technology
organizations were not accomplished in a single concen- (CASE tools) in systems development, we believe that the
trated implementation period. Rather, these occurred issue of implementation pace applies more generally to
episodically over a long period of time. Comparing these other organizational changes as well. The broader question
research findings to practices in Japanese firms, Tyre and of whether radical change associated with new information
Orlikowski (1993) conclude that some incremental changes technologies is better implemented swiftly or more eau-
to technologies and work practices may be implemented tiously is one that transcends the particular details of the
more effectively if managed in a phased or episodic man- change being attempted.
ncr.
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.4 Implications for Managing Change
Our field study investigated the implementation of a set of
Despite these various discussions of implementing change, integrated CASE tools in a large chemical products com-
there remains little guidance to help change managers pany located in the midwest, hereafter called MidCo. We
choose an appropriate pace for the radical change they wish were interested in understanding the systems development
to accomplish. As we saw above, many of the discussions changes associated with these CASE tools. Data were
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collected through on-site interviews executed during two 3. RESEARCH RESULTS
separate visits four months apart, follow-up telephone
interviews, and a review of available documentation. The 3.1 Context for the Changes in Systems Development
on-site interviews followed a semi-structured interview
protocol and lasted about an hour in length. Thirty-five MidCo's corporate IS division was centralized with approx-
respondents participated in our study, representing several imately 90 full-time employees organized into six depart-
different divisions at MidCo (both business and IS) and ments each headed by a department manager. Three of the
several different organization levels (staff, department departments were application development groups that
managers, and division managers). Table 1 shows the developed information systems for specific business divi-
distribution of respondents across vertical and functional sions and three were technical support groups. The appli-
lines. The documentation we examined included general cation development groups were organized around the
information about the organization, as well as specific major divisions of the corporation: R&D, Logistics, and
materials related to the evaluation and implementation of an "umbrella group" of traditional business functions:
CASE tools.
The IS managers and staff referred to the user departments
Data analysis employed qualitative techniques (Glaser and they supported as "customers" rather than as users. The
Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 1994). We searched mission of IS was described by the IS director as follows:
our interview transcripts and available documentation for
themes, using a technique of open coding that allowed us to To be a value-added business partner, to help our
detect patterns in the data which were consistent across customers do their jobs - but as a partnership,
respondents, or which showed divergence across different not a service to them.
types of respondents. In the case of inconsistency or
incompleteness, we probed for clarification and confirma- Although the lS division did not directly charge the busi-
tion during our second site visit and through telephone ness divisions for its services, there was nonetheless a sense
of ownership by each business division for the systemsinterviews.
requested by them. The business divisions also assumed an
MidCo is a multi-national chemical products company with
informal claim over the IS staff within the specific applica-
revenues of $1.4 billion and over 5,000 employees world- tion development group that supported them.
wide in 1991. MidCo competes in several different market
IS was both similar to and different from the business.niches and is the market share leader in its various product
segments. MidCo's profitability is driven by its relative Employee turnover in IS was very low, as in the rest of thecompany. The commitment to quality, innovation, andsuperiority in chemical technology and this is understood to empowerment, so prevalent in the rest of the company, alsobe critically dependent on R&D effort and excellence. This pervaded IS. For example, there was a shared belief that
understanding is reflected in the prominence afforded R&D the role of IS was to "empower users to do their jobs with
within the company. Nearly all executives occupying the available information," as one senior IS manager put it,
CEO and COO offices have come from positions in R&D; The IS division differed from the other business divisions
investment in research is heavily supported (5.1% of in that it had a larger proportion of younger members and
revenues in 1991). One executive highlighted the critical women employees, About half of the IS employees were
position of R&D by noting that "research drives the vision women, including five of six IS department managers. An
here - everything else is in the dust." The managerial IS manager observed:
philosophy expressed by senior managers suggests a will-
ingness to make current investments in order to reap future We are risk takers. We are pushy. We are very
gains. Respondents frequently mentioned MidCo as a young age-wise. We have as many female as
"[chemical] technology leader" and the firm had adopted a male employees. Everyone gets an equal chance
firm-wide quality management program in 1987. This in the IS organization.
quality management program, based on the approach of
Deming (1962), was initiated to strengthen and sustain the
company's strong performance, rather than to resolve any 3.2 Background to the Changes in
particular problem areas. The Deming approach was Systems Development
selected because it was seen to be consistent with MidCo's
scientific and engineering culture. A long-term goal stated Prior to implementing CASE tools, MidCo was using the
by one of the executives was to achieve "a flatter, em- Method/1 systems development methodology purchased
powered orgaliization," with teamwork and ready access to from Arthur Andersen. The Method/1 methodology pro-
information across departmental lines. vides software development guidelines based on a set of
structured, process-oriented design principles (cf. Yourdon
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Table 1. List of Interview Respondents by Position and Function
Level in Organization IS Business Total
Senior Executive 1 3 4
(e.g., Vice President, Division Manager)
Middle Manager 6 3 9
(e.g., Department Head)
Staff 16 6 22
(e.g., Project Manager, Analyst)
Total 23 12 35
and Constantine 1978). In 1987, the IS division created a IEF' (Information Engineering Fac·Uity from Texas Instru-
Data Administration group, which began using James ments) and a hand-picked project team was assembled to
Martin's (1982, 1990) data-centered Information Engi- perform a pilot project. After a short but intensive pilot
neering (IE) approach to guide their systems planning study, the Evaluation Committee recominended that MidCo
efforts. At this time, there were no automated tools avail- purchase IEF and proceed with full-scale implementation of
able to support the IE methodology and manual methods both IE and IEF across all IS division activities. In a
were used to perform the various IE analyses. This period formal report in December, 1989, the Evaluation Committee
coincided with the adoption by senior MidCo maliagement outlined the IS division's goals for full implementation of
of Deining's quality management program and the acquisi- IE and 1EF and issued a set of detailed implementation
tion of the IE methodology was seen as compatible with recommendations. In their report, the committee empha-
this broader quality initiative. The deployment of IE, sized how IE reflected and reinforced the quality principles
however, did not extetid beyond the Data Administration being practiced at MidCo:
Group and the rest of the IS division continued to follow
the Method/1 systems development methodology. IE and quality management have many things in
common and are, in fact, mutually supportive of
In 1988, the IS division began experimenting with two one aliother. Both are founded on teamwork and a
early CASE tools. These were not integrated CASE tools, scientific approach based on data....Implementing
but stand-alone tools that each supported a single step of the IE approach...would reinforce the quality
the system development life cycle. One was an upper- management effort and further strengthen the
CASE tool, called information Engineering Workbench quality of systems development at MidCo.
(IEW), which was based on the IE methodology, while the
other was a lower-CASE tool, Teloi. which allowed IS During 1990, each of the IS division's three application
analysts to generate application code. Both of these stand- development groups initiated projects using IE and IEF.
alone tools received limited use within the IS division, their Several consultants from Texas Instruments were on-site
lack of integration with the rest of the development life- during this first year to provide expertise, advice, and
cycle proving to be a significant drawback. support with the implementation. Training on IEF was
conducted in small groups, with separate courses for each
In 1988, the Data Administration group decided to evaluate of the seven steps of the IEF methodology (see Table 3).
software tools to structure their data management activities. MidCo tried to have its employees trained as close as
They first reviewed and rejected a group of data dictionary possible to when they needed a specific skill, an approach
tools and then shifted attention to a class of integrated- the respondents referred to as "just-in-time training."
CASE software tools which were being introduced to the
market at that time. At this point, the Data Administration At the time of our second site visit (in late 1991), IEF was
group realized the potential of integrated tools for sup- being used on eight concurrent projects by the three appli-
porting all of lS development and derived a set of product cation development groups. While use of IEF was not
evaluation criteria that reflected their new understanding of mandatory, it was "highly encouraged" by senior IS mana-
the value of integrated CASE tools to MidCo (see Table 2). gers. These managers allowed the different application
An Evaluation Committee consisting of IS managers and development groups to use IE and IEF in various and
senior analysts was formed in 1989 to conduct a detailed customized ways, permitting them to deviate from the
review of three major integrated CASE tools.i Based on guidelines recommended by both the IE methodology and
the evaluation criteria, the committee members selected the IEF tool. For example, in contrast to the recommended
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Table 2. MidCo's Selection Criteria for Choosing a CASE Tool
(Source: MidCo Corporation, IEF Project, December, 1989, p. 2.3)
• The need for complete life cycle support
• The support of a data-driven methodology.
• The need for a fully integrated set of tools to support the life cycle.
Rekeying of data is to be minimized.
• The availability of the toolset on the PC, in particular the analysis,
design, and at least some testing.
• The enforcement of a particular methodology, eliminating the potential
of varying from a given approach.
• The support of multiple platforms
Table 3. Description of the Stages of Information Engineering
(Source: Texas Instruments, Introduction to /4/brmation Engineering, 1990, pp. 3-4)
Information Strategy Planning (ISP) - Planners gain a broad view of the information needs of the business. From
this information, they create a blueprint for the future and subdivide the blueprint into smaller segments.
Business Area Analysis (BAA) - Analysts examine a particular segment of the business called a business area.
They develop a detailed, conceptual model of this business area, based on its information needs.
Business System Design CBSD) - Designers detail a business system within a particular business area. They
consider how the user will interact with the business system, without concerning themselves with the target computing
environment.
Technical Design (TD) - Designers tailor the result of BSD to a target computing environment. They consider the
hardware environment, operating system, teleprocessing monitor and database management system.
Construction - Developers generate all the executable components of a system. These include programs, databases,
job control statements, screen formats, and transaction definitions. These pieces enable an application system to run in
the selected target environment.
Transition - Developers install a newly constructed application system in a production environment. This phased
installation may involve replacing existing systems or portions of systems.
Production - The business realizes the full benefit of the application system. 1ts execution satisfies specific
business needs identified during the ISP.
use of IEF which calls for the derivation of a top-down ness system. Instead, each business division was permitted
enterprise-wide information model or Information Strategy leeway to conduct the ISP or to proceed directly to the next
Plan (ISP), senior IS managers had decided not to require a IE phase, Business Area Analysis (BAA). The expectation
top-down ISP for the corporation at the outset. Similarly, was that divisions would return to complete an ISP after
most IS project managers did not insist that individual having gained experience with using IE and IEF on single
business divisions create their own ISP before they em- applications.
barked on the design and development of a specific busi-
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33 The Nature or the Changes ment of IE and IEF in the IS division; it stipulated that a
in Systems Development number of business users had to be significantly involved
during the analysis phases of a project and that they had to
MidCo's primary goal for investing in CASE tools was to take responsibility for project deliverables. This expanded
adopt and iinpleinent the principles of data-centered design, and more participatory role afforded the users was de-
which IE embodied and IEF enabled. This shift from a scribed by one IS analyst as
structured, process-centered systeins development approach
to a data-centered one can be characterized as a radical Now they [users] are an integral part of the devel-
change in systems development (Fichman and Kemerer opment effort. Their input into the development
1992; Orlikowski 1993). As might be expected, this radical must be constant and ongoing...they must be
innovation involved a number of significant changes to the dedicated full-time.
work of systems development. One IS manager com-
Inented on this innovation by contrasting it to others she Such increased attention to users represented a significant
had experienced: departure from prior systems development efforts and
coincided with and reflected the increased emphasis being
The change resulting from IE is the methodology, placed on empowerment and learning in the rest of the
not just the automation....People didn't see a large organization.
change with code generators, but with integrated-
CASE - it changes the way you work. Respondents also noted that projects using IE and IEF
began to have a particularly inter-disciplinary and cross-
Another IS manager noted that functional character. There was a greater emphasis on
integrating and coordinating project planning across several
when you talk about bringing about a major business divisions during the early stages of BAA. These
change such as CASE tools, you are really chang- integrating efforts typically occurred in Joint Applicationing the way people work. Development (JAD) sessions, a mechanism recommended
We found evidence for three specific types of changes that by the IE methodology, where business requirements are
were associated with the radical innovation implemented by identified by IS and user staff.5 Another new coordinating
MidCo: changes in IS analysts' skills, changes in the role
mechanism was the creation of the information architect
of users on project teams, and changes in coordination role, filled full-time by an analyst from Data Administration
who assumed responsibility for coordinating the dataacross multiple project teams.
models of all projects, ensuring consistency across them,
Many respondents commented that use of the CASE tools
minimizing data redundancy, and assuring data quality.
had changed their role from application programmers to
business analysts. Because the new IE-based systems
development process was more oriented toward business 3.4 The Pace of Implementing Changes
in Systems Developmentissues, a greater proportion of the tasks performed during
systems development focused on business analysis com-
pared to more traditional methodologies, including the The overall change in MidCo's systems development
previously-used Method/l. In addition, respondents noted process (the shift from a process-oriented to a data-oriented
that the skills and knowledge they needed to develop systems design approach) involved a series of changes,
systems with IEF no longer covered areas such as program- beginning with the initial implementation of IE on a limited
ming, hardware details, and operating system specifics. For basis within Data Administration and then its diffusion
example, respondents no longer needed their detailed along with IEF to the rest of the IS division. As is evident
knowledge of traditional programming languages (e.g., from Table 4, this shift took several years and was not
COBOL) and database design techniques to be productive. absorbed all at once. The IS director stated, and many
Their use of IEF facilitated a greater focus on the business other respondents concurred, that "the move to CASE was
alid more conceptual aspects of systems, decreasing their an evolution, rather than a revolution." Another IS mana-
prior preoccupation with technical matters. ger similarly noted
Changes in roles and skills also extended to the user This [the change to IE and IEF] requires tremen-
groups, because use of IE and IEF had increased the level dous amounts of patience. It's a long slow pro-
of user involvement on all system development teams. A cess....I knew from day one that it was going to be
new IS policy had been implemented as part of the deploy- right. It just takes a loiig time.
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Table 4. Implementation of Radical Process Changes in Mideo
(shaded cells represent background events to the process changes)
BACKGROUND DATE
hiple,lient;Ilion nt 1 INe „t Mi'#ind// ,+tnict,Ired sy#len,4 develt,rnlent 1QX5
inellt*!1'114!y
Aili,put,11 4,1 Quillily Munlige,Ile:,1 Pri,grut,1 1487
PROCESS CHANGE DATE
Formation of Data Administration Group 1987
Adoption and implementation of /E in Data Administration Group 1987
Adoption and limited use of LEW in Data Administration Group 1988
Adoption and limited use of Telon in IS Division 1988
Pilot study of IEF 1989
Adoption if /E and /EF by whole IS Division 1990
Use of /E and IEF in "Umbrella" Division
First use of IEF on a project 1990
First use of ISP 1990
Use of IE and /EF in R&D Division:
First use of IEF on a project 1990
First use of ISP -
Use of /E and /EF in Logistics Division
First use of IEF on a project 1991
First use of ISP 1992 (scheduled)
Mideo' s gradual pace of implementing radical change The general experience of the radical changes within
significantly influenced the general experience of the MidCo appeared to be surprisingly uneventful. A striking
change by the organization and its employees. For some finding was the apparent absence of resistance by both IS
respondents, particularly those employees who had already employees and users. While our interviews probed for
been using IE for up to two years before IEF was adopted, evidence of resistance, disruption, frustration, and unantici-
the implementation of the IEF tool was seen as a continua- pated problems associated with the changes, we found no
tion of a change already begun and therefore they were such data. In fact, the reactions of our respondents was
willing and able to embrace it with relative ease. generally very positive. One IS manager, who described
the CASE implementation as "far more successful than we
For the other IS employees, who had not been previously expected," noted that most of the project teams were eager
exposed to IE, the implementation experience was moder- to try out the IE methodology and IEF tool. As she put it,
ated by the control they perceived over when and how they "people are clamoring for it - people want it."
would assimilate the IE methodology and IEF tool. Not
required to assimilate both changes immediately and in full, The one concern we detected from a few respondeiits was
these employees were able to more gradually accommodate some skepticism. However, even this was accompanied by
the changes. Because IS managers had provided an oppor- a willingness to stay open-minded and to wait and see if IE
tunity for employees to adapt the implementation of IE and and IEF delivered the promised benefits. One senior
IEF to their own schedules, the changes were not perceived business manager commented that "we are taking the
as overwhelming or threatening - a common response to benefits on a leap of faith right now," but indicated that he
radical chaliges in the workplace. expected to observe benefits in the near future. l Ie noted
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that other managers in his division had adopted a "wait- appears that MidCo's radical change had proceeded rela-
and-see attitude" toward the changes. This reaction reflects tively smoothly, without the turbulence typically associated
the gradual i,nplementation strategy adopted by MidCo in with radical organizational changes. In particular, the
that it had permitted each business division to implement implementation of IE and IEF did not generate active
the changes at their own pace rather than forcing them all opposition froin employees in either the IS or the business
to accept and implement the changes immediately. The divisions. On the contrary, these changes were enthusiasti-
decision not to conduct an enterprise-wide or top-down ISP cally received and appeared to be causing minimal disrup-
for the whole business allowed each business division to tion in operations and morale.
control its own implementation of IE and IEF, deciding
when and whether to conduct an ISP and when to focus on The MidCo study suggests - in contrast to recommenda-
specific application areas so as to produce tangible system lions advocating rapid implementation of radical change -
products. This decision appears to have been appropriate that there may be conditions where a gradual or episodic
for the MidCo orgaliizational context, as a senior executive pace of implementing radical change may be effective. Our
explained Lhal business managers would not be willing to findings emphasize the importance of not only distin-
wait for the completion of a top-down ISP data model guishing the pace of implementing change from the nature
before requesting specific application systems. of the change, but of understanding how they relate.
Where the nature of a change refers to what magnitude of
Based on their first full year of experience using liE and change is intended or realized (radical versus incremental),
[EF in the three application development groups, respon- the pace of implementing change refers to how the change
dents described their enthusiasm for continuing to develop is being implemented, that is, the speed with which it is
systems using the new approach. In addition, due to the introduced (rapid versus gradual). From this perspective,
greater emphasis on business planning and analysis - the nature and pace of change are seen as conceptually
which IE and IEF enable - some IS managers indicated distinct dimensions of change that become related in the
that further organizational changes were now possible. For implementation of any particular· change. How these are to
exalnple, several managers described that some functions be related in any particular change project is thus a choice
currently residing in the central IS group would be "dis- that should be made by the change agents involved.
persed lo the business divisions over the next five years."
This general decentralization of IS to the business divisions, The distinction between the nature of chatige and pace of
enabled by the systems development changes of IE and implementing change essentially decouples the two dimen-
IEF, had already begun at the time of our second site visit. sions, allowing us to imagine the possibility of imple-
One IS application group - that supporting the prominent menting radical (and incremental) changes rapidly or
and powerful R&D division - had been reorganized so gradually. Table 5 shows the separate dimensions of nature
, that it was physically located within the R&D division and and pace of change and uses this as a structure for mapping
reported to R&D management. IS managers describing this this and other research which investigates the implementa-
transfer noted that IE and IEF had facilitated this change tion of organizational and technological change along these
because they allowed a tighter alignment of IS and business dimensions. In this table, we can see that both radical and
interests and promoted a closer working relationship be- incremental changes may be implemented gradually or
tween IS and the R&D division. rapidly. This begs the question, if a rapid or gradual pace
may be used to implement radical change, what are the
conditions under which a certain pace is suggested? Based
5. DISCUSSION on our study of MidCo and an examination of the literature,
we suggest that there are two key elements that may
Based on MidCo's experiences with implementing CASE facilitate or inhibit a gradual pace of implementation:
tools, it appears that they had implemented a radical change characteristics of the organizational context and characteris-
in their system development process and that they had done ties of the technological innovation. We examine each in
so gradually. The pace of implementation we observed turn.
more closely resembled the episodic pattern identified by
Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) in that the change was iinple-
mented in phases, rather than the rapid and revolutionary 4.1 Characteristics of the Organizational Context
pattern advocated by Hammer and others. But in contrast
to Tyre and Orlikowski's phases which involved only With respect to the organizational context, MidCo had
incremental changes, each of MidCo's phases represented a certain structural and cultural characteristics that appeared
radical change in systems development when compared to to contribute to the effectiveness of implementing radical
the existing practice of developing systems. Further, it changes gradually. First, the company had a tradition of
333
Table 5. The Nature and the Pace of Change: Two
Dimensions of Research on Organizational Change
Pace of Change
Gradual Rapid
Nature of Change
Ettlie 1986 Liker 1987
Radical Gallivan, Hofman and Orlikowski 1993
Orlikowski 1984
Seeger, Lorsch and
Gibson 1974
Mackay 1990 Kraut Dumais and
Koch 1989
Incremental Orlikowski 1993 Orlikowski 1992
Tyre and Orlikowski 1994
valuing investments in technology that might not have In this light, it is instructive to compare MidCo' s experi-
immediate payoffs. Expectations in this research-oriented ence with that of another firm implementing E and IEF, as
firm thus ireflected a willingness to invest time and re- described by Orlikowski in her examination of a firm called
sources to achieve long-term benefits. Second, the corpo- PCC. In particular, the experiences and outcomes around
rate philosophy reflected a commitment to quality, empow- the radical change experienced by MidCo differ substan-
erment, and learning. As an executive observed, "we are in tially from those experienced by PCC. Differences in the
the learning business." The cultural norms and work organizational conditions around PCC's change are worth
practices within IS similarly reflected these sentiments, as recounting as they serve as a useful contrast to those we
is evident in the focus on teamwork, user involvement, and detected at MidCo.
empowering the business. Third, there was no immediate
crisis in systems development to compel MidCo to rush the Like MidCo, PCC introduced IE and IEF into its systems
implementation of IE and IEF. The motivation to adopt development activities and, like MidCo, this represented a
radical changes in the absence of serious problems parallels radical change in PCC' s process of systems development.
the motivation behind the company's adoption of Deming's However, the pace of implementation adopted by PCC
quality management program - a sense that things could managers was rapid, unlike that at MidCo. At PCC, both
be better. Fourth, the company was doing well financially IE and IEF were introduced simultaneously, thus IS and
and so had sufficient stack resources to implement change business personnel had to learn and assimilate the data
slowly. It could thus afford to adopt a more measured pace modeling concepts of the new methodology at the same
and to spend time on training, consulting, experimentation, time as they were learning to use IEF. PCC also initiated
and feedback. Clearly these characteristics will not be IE and IEF by enforcing the execution of a top-down ISP
present in the organizational context surrounding all new for the entire business. This represented an enormous
technology adoptions, and hence the experiences at MidCo effort for both IS and the business, because the ISP relied
do not represent a universal strategy for achieving radical on design principles that were unfamiliar to most of the
change, however they do point to some possible ones. participants, particularly the business users. Finally, the IS
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division instituted a new policy of only developing systems that one group preceded another in adopting the IEF tool
in the sequence recommended by the resulting top-down for performing strategic systems planning did not render the
ISP. Thus, PCC' s IS division changed the rules by which change an incremental one, since it did not reduce the
it delivered service to the business divisions and it did so scope of the required change to a "minor improvement or
abruptly. Not surprisingly, these changes precipitated simple adjustment in current technology" (Dewar and
strong resistance from business managers and users, which Dutton 1986, p. 1423). Hence, contrary to the possible
threatened to undermine the entire change initiative. At interpretation that MidCo had simply achieved an overall
MidCo, in contrast, the new rules for delivering systems radical change through a series of incremental changes, we
services to business divisions were implemented gradually, believe that MidCo was adopting a series of radical changes
with much less disruption. through gradually implementing them into distinct work
groups. The radicalness (Damanpour 1988) of changes in
This contrast between MidCo and PCC suggests that a developers' work processes, knowledge, and coordination
significant benefit associated with a gradual implementation efforts was not diminished by MidCo's phased implementa-
of radical change may be that it is often experienced as Lion tactics which were facilitated by the innovation's
more palatable. This may significantly reduce the level of divisibility. The st,ategy of decomposing a radical innova-
user resistatice to the change. When combined with other don into discrete phases for separate work groups (indivi-
aspects of the organizational context such as a nurturing dualization) or into separate components (modularization)
aid self-developing culture, a resource munificence, and an does not necessarily transform a radical change into a series
oriel,tation to intiovation and experimentation, these may of incremental ones.
add up to an effective set of conditions for implementing
radical changes over a longer period of time. Research suggests that the divisibility of an innovation
increases the likelihood of more effective implementation
fur three reasons. First, as Rousseau (1989, p. 43) notes,
4.2 Characteristics of the introducing changes "one by one...increases employee
Technological Innovation confidence in their abilities to learn and use new systems."
Hence, the users are more willing to participate in the
Prior research on the management of technological innova- change since the stakes are reduced and the costs to them
tion suggests that characteristics of the innovation itself are decreased.
may also iI,fluence the pace of implementatioti, not just the
context into which it is being introduced. One such charac- Second, divisibility provides opportunities for experi-
teristic is the extent to which a particular technological menting with the innovation and making changes to it. As
innovation can be subdivided into smaller components, a Leonard-Barton (1988b, p. 613) notes, "Divisibility is an
concept that has been variously labeled divisibility (Rogers important implementation characteristic because it allows
1962: Leonard-Barton 1988b), trialability (Rogers 1971), trial of a new technology for the purposes of feedback and
and reversibility (Walton 1975). Leonard-Barton (1988b) learning." For example, Tyre and Orlikowski (1993, 1994)
differentiates the concept of divisibility into two subcon- show how discrete episodes of change - which they label
structs: modularization and individualization. The former "windows of opportunity - allowed users to accumulate
allows for segmenting the innovation or the change pro- particular problems or desired enhancements to their tech-
gram into discrete chunks, while the latter allows the nology or work procedures until they were ready to make
innovation to be ilnplemented into parts of the organization changes. Without this pacing of issues, users felt too
in sequence. overwhelmed and too busy to take the time to fix all of
their problems at once. Likewise, Leonard-Barton's
Examining the gradual implementation process at MidCo in (1988a) notion of cycles of mutual adaptation recognizes
terms of these concepts, we see that it was both modula- that, when a technology is first introduced, misalignments
rized and individualized. Table 4 shows that different always exist between the technology and the organization.
components of IE aizd IEF were itnplemented over time and Such misalignments cannot all be resolved up front and it is
the various divisions and project teams chose to use these only over time, through iterative cycles of change, that the
as appropriate. Within each application development group, technology and the organization can be aligned with each
the adoption of IE and IEF represented radical innovations other.
to software development, because when compared to the
, previous systems development approaches in use, they were Third, users will be better able to assimilate the innovation
"clear departures from existing practice" (Dewar and because they can implement it ina piecemeal fashion and
Dutton 1986, p. 1423). Each implementation phase was hence can control the pace of the changes they experience.
thus still a radical change, not an incremental one, The fact Leonard-Barton recommends that, where an innovation is
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modularizable, that sponsors and champions "allow user [Gould 1989]and meteorology [Gleick 1987]), these are
managers some control over the pace of change, by pre- examples of unintended changes. We certainly believe that
senting the potential for implementation in phases, rather unintended changes are inevitable whenever shifts occur in
than all at once" (1988b, p. 626). physical, biological, or social systems. Sometimes the
accumulation of quantitative shifts may at some point
These notions of windows of opportunity, cycles of mutual transform an entity into a qualitatively different one (011-
adaptation, and controlled change suggest that significant man 1971). However, in the context of trying to under-
benefits in learning, participation, and flexibility may be stand how to manage organizational change, we are con-
afforded by a gradual pace, whereas such benefits may be cerned with change that can be planned, guided, and con-
forfeited in the rush to implement rapidly. This clearly trolled; that is, intended change. As a result, we have not
happened at MidCo, where the use of IE and 1EF was and cannot within the scope of this paper, considered the
encouraged but not enforced from the top, and where question of how to implement unintended radical change.
divisions were allowed to adopt this software development
innovation at their own pace over a period of time rather In the case of MidCo, managers of the IS division clearly
than all at once. had intentions for the nature of the change: wanting to
radically change the way of developing systems and de-
With regard to the generality of the gradual approach to livering service to their clients. Their intentions for the
implementing radical change, we recognize that not all pace of implementation reflected an understanding of their
innovations may be divisible to the degree observed at organizational context. In particular, they realized that
MidCo. In evaluating the various strategies involved in requiring radical changes to be implemented all at once
divisibility, however, it is useful to consider separately an would run against the grain of MidCo's long-standing
innovation's modularization and its individualization. participatory and learning-oriented culture. Hence, they
While not all radical innovations may be modularizable, encouraged the involvement of the divisions in realizing the
since, in some cases, the new processes, knowledge, and intended radical changes by allowing them to design and
structures are so interdependent that they must be imple- control their own process for implementing and adopting
mented as a whole (e.g., the paradigm shift associated with the radical changes represented by the IE methodology and
a radically new scientific theory), many more innovations IE CASE tools.
can be individualizable, that is, phased in into discrete work
units or sites in sequence. Many authors have, in fact, While MidCo's managers utilized their company's favor-
advocated such an implementation strategy to allow an able conditions for gradually implementing radical change,
organization to learn from the implementation experiences there certainly are conditions where pursuing such a gradual
of the early adopters of the radical change. For example, pace would be counterindicated. In particular, where a
Opper and Fersko-Weiss (1992) recommend a staged company or department is facing a crisis, whether an
implementation of new technology, using distinct phases of external competitive threat or an internal crisis of legitima-
experimental and expanded pilot studies, where each pilot tion or production, managers' intentions are focused on
draws on the previous one's experiences. Other researchers survival, and hence they are likely to initiate a rapid imple-
have described the benefits of vicarious learning (Leonard- mentation of radical change. Likewise, where a company
Barton 1990, p. 186) through which potential users of a or department has a track record of not being able to
new technology can acquire the know-how and know-why of sustain a change process over an extended period of tilne,
earlier adopters, either within the same organization or or where there is limited organizational capacity for change
externally (through product user groups). (Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee 1992), managers may believe
it is prudent to implement as much change as is possible as
quickly as possible. Under these conditions, managers'
4.3 Managerial Intentions intentions for rapid implementation would seem appropriate
given that the opportunity to change anything later may be
In this paper we have been considering the question of how lost as enthusiasm wanes, skepticism grows, resistance
to implement radical organizational change. Implicit in this accumulates, resources are reallocated, and champions are
question is the assumption that there is an intention by the reassigned.
stakeholders - usually managers - to accomplish radical
change. Thus our focus is specifically on the question of
how to implement inrended radical change. While there are 5. CONCLUSION
many instances where a series of small incremental changes
can, when aggregated over an extended period of time, The research we reported in this paper drew on a field
result in a radical change (e.g., species differentiation study to analyze one implementation of a radical organiza-
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